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Summary 
In marine insurance causation is a fundamental principle. Causation defines 
if a loss falls under the insurance policy or if the loss is too remote to be 
considered under the insurance policy. In order to define the necessary 
causal connection different principles are used in different countries, or in 
relation to different perils. In England the proximate cause principle is used 
while the Nordic Plan mainly uses a principle of apportionment. 
 
According to the doctrine of proximate cause the entire loss shall be 
attributed to the peril proximately caused the loss. It is also possible for the 
court to find several proximate causes for the loss and in such a case the 
insurance policy will respond if one cause is covered while one in not 
covered. However, the Wayne Tank principle prescribes that if one cause is 
expressly excluded the assured cannot recover under the insurance policy. 
There are some exceptions to the proximate cause rule e.g. if the loss is 
intentionally caused by the assured or if the parties has agreed that a 
different causal expression shall be used. 
 
In the Nordic Plan, which entered into force the 1
st
 of January 2013, a rule 
of apportionment is used. This means that the loss can be apportioned 
between several causes of legal relevance depending on how much they 
have contributed to the loss. The most important exception to the 
apportionment rule is that the modified dominant cause principle is used for 
the combination of marine and war perils. Under the Nordic Plan the parties 
have, similar as in England, the possibility to change causal expression by 
contract. 
 
The primary difference between the two systems is that loss can be 
apportioned between several different perils under the Nordic Plan while the 
English approach not allows the loss to be distributed over several perils. 
Even if there is substantial differences between the two systems there are 
also some similarities e.g. both systems contains some special rules in 
regard of. war perils and radioactive contamination.  
 
In other common law jurisdictions the proximate cause rule has been used 
traditionally but some criticism against the principle has been brought 
forward. In Canada the rule has developed, especially in regard of the 
Wayne Tank principle, as a response to the criticism. In Australia on the 
other hand the proximate cause rule is still used but some criticism has been 
brought forward.  
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Sammanfattning  
I sjöförsäkring är kausalitet en fundamental princip. Kausalitet avgör om en 
förlust ska anses falla under försäkringen eller om förlusten är för avlägsen 
för att bli beaktad. För att definiera vilket kausalt samband som är 
nödvändigt har olika principer används i olika länder, eller i relation till 
olika sjörisker. I England har ”the proximate cause” principen används 
medan den nordiska sjöförsäkringsplanen i huvudsak använder 
fördelningsprincipen.  
 
Enligt doktrinen om ”proximate causes” ska hela förlusten hänföras till den 
sjörisk som i huvudsak orsakade förlusten. Det är även möjligt för 
domstolen att finna att flera sjörisker tillsammans är huvudorsaker och i så 
fall täcker försäkringen om en sjöförsäkring är täckt även om en annan inte 
är täckt. Däremot föreskriver Wayne Tank principen att om en av 
huvudorsakerna är uttryckligen undantagen så kan inte den försäkrade bli 
kompenserad under försäkringen. Det finns några undantag till principen om 
”proximate causes” exempelvis om förlusten är uppsåtligen orsakad av den 
försäkrade eller om parterna har kommit överrens om att en annan kausal 
princip ska gälla. 
 
I den nordiska sjöförsäkringsplanen, som trädde i kraft den första januari 
2013, används en fördelningsregel. Detta innebär att förlusten kan fördelas 
mellan flera juridiskt relevanta anledningar till förlusten beroende på hur 
mycket de har bidragit till förlusten. Det viktigaste undantaget till 
fördelningsprincipen är att ett annat kausalt uttryck används för 
kombinationen sjö- och krigsrisker där en modifierad dominerande 
orsaksprincip används. Under den nordiska sjöförsäkringsplanen har 
parterna, liknande som i England, möjligheten att i kontraktet ändra vilket 
kausalt begrepp som ska användas. 
 
Den främsta skillnaden mellan de två systemen är att förlusten kan bli 
fördelad mellan flera olika sjörisker under den nordiska 
sjöförsäkringsplanen medan det engelska systement inte tillåter att förlusten 
fördelas. Även om det finns substantiella skillnader mellan de två systemen 
finns det också några likheter, exempelvis så finns det i båda systemen 
specialregler för krigsrisker och radioaktiv kontaminering. 
 
I andra common law länder har ”proximate cause” principen används 
traditionellt men det har framkommit kritik mot principen. I Kanada har 
principen utvecklats, speciellt i relation till Wayne Tank principen, som ett 
svar till kritiken. I Australien å andra sidan används fortfarande ”proximate 
cause” principen men viss kritik har framkommit.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Marine insurance is essential for the marine trade and any prudent 
shipowner insures his ship against various risks. The ship and its equipment 
are insured through hull insurance which also contain some elements of 
liability insurance in connection with collisions. A prudent ship owner 
would also have a cover against e.g. war risks, strike risks and possible 
liabilities but it is possible to insure against other risks as well.
1
 
 
The actual cover of a marine insurance policy varies. For the scope of cover 
it is firstly important to view what perils are insured against e.g. if the policy 
offers an “all-risk” cover or nominated perils only. The insurance policy 
also provides what losses are covered, for example if only total losses are 
included or also partial losses.
2
 Another important question in deciding the 
cover of the insurance policy is the question of causation.
3
 Causation 
concerns what connection is needed between a casualty and the marine 
insurance policy i.e. what loss the insurer is liable to compensate for. 
 
The primary issue regarding causation in marine insurance is when several 
perils causing the loss. The problem arises when not all the perils are 
insured under the same policy, or when a peril is uncovered alternatively 
excluded. In this situation the question arises as to where the loss should fall 
or which underwriter will be liable to compensate for the loss.  
 
The legislative framework in England is the Marine Insurance Act
4
 but 
many principles are also contained in case law. English marine insurance is 
by tradition of importance and the English hull conditions
5
 are widely used. 
Many states also look at the English system when making their own 
legislation. In regard of causation the concept of “proximate cause” is used 
in England, which means that the loss shall fall under the policy insuring the 
proximate or dominant cause of loss.
6
 
 
In the Nordic countries
7
 there are some legislation in regard of insurance. 
Insurance contracts are governed by an Insurance Contract Act
8
 specific to 
                                                 
1
 Professor Rhidian Thomas, Unpublished lecture notes from Lund University, 2012, p. 15 
2
 Ibid. 
3
Wilhelmsen Trine-Lise and Bull Hans Jacob, Handbook in Hull Insurance, Gyldendal 
Akademisk, 2007, p. 79 
4
 1906 c. 41 (Regnal. 6 Edw 7) 
5
 Standard contract used in marine insurance e.g. International Hull Clauses and 
Institutional Time Clauses 
6
 Bennet, Howard, The law of marine insurance, 2d ed, Oxford university press, 2006, p. 
302 
7
 Here “the Nordic countries” refers to Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland.  
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every country. Due to corporation and the influence the Nordic countries 
have on each other these acts are similar in content and scope. However, the 
Insurance Contract Acts are in most parts not mandatory for marine 
insurance wherefore various standard contracts have developed. Latest in 
time is the Nordic Plan which is developed by the industry and based on the 
Norwegian Plan of 1996, version 2010. The Nordic Plan entered into force 
1
st
 of January 2013.
9
  
 
The Nordic Plan handles causation through the apportionment principle. 
According to the apportionment principle it is possible to allocate the loss 
over different marine policies, i.e. an underwriter can be liable to 
compensate for a part of the loss only.
 10
  
1.2 Scope and Purpose 
This thesis aims at comparing the principle of causation in marine hull 
insurance in England and in the Nordic countries. The comparison is 
interesting since the English and Nordic markets are among the biggest 
markets for marine insurance but the approach in relation to causation is 
different. The comparison will also provide a good foundation for the 
discussion of benefits and disadvantages with the different causal 
expressions. 
 
When examine the situation in England focus will be on the Marine 
Insurance Act and case law dealing with the act. Well-known standard 
contracts will also be brought forward to some extent. In regard of the 
Nordic countries focus will be on the Nordic Plan and where relevant for the 
Nordic Plan examples from the Norwegian Plan. However, principles and 
developments in relation to other Nordic countries have been left outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
The general question of this thesis is how England and the Nordic countries 
treat causation. By that meant that the thesis will consider similarities and 
differences between the two systems and compare them. The question has 
been divided into sub-question on which the thesis will focus.  
 
The first sub-question concerns the situation of several perils causing the 
loss. Namely, if there are several perils for the loss who will be held liable 
to compensate? This question is one of the more challenging questions in 
regard of causation. The question also includes what happens if not both 
perils are insured under the same insurance policy. Will any of them take 
precedency?  
                                                                                                                            
8
 Swedish Insurance Contract Act (2005:104); Finish Insurance Contract Act 
28.6.1994/543, Norwegian Insurance Contract Act 16 June 1989 No. 69.; Danish Insurance 
Contract Act LBK nr 999 af 05/10/2006 
9
Falkanger, Thor, Hans, Jacob Bull et alia, Scandinavian maritme law - The Norwegian 
perspective, 2 edn, Universitetsforlaget, 2008, p. 476 – 477; 
The Nordic Marine Insurance Plan of 2013, the Preface 
10
 The Commentary to the Nordic Plan, cl. 2-13 
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The second sub-question is if there are any perils that are treated differently. 
In such a case, how?  
 
Thirdly, how do the different causational expressions affect the market and 
what are the developments of the proximate cause principle in other 
common law jurisdictions? Are there any lessons to be learned i.e. would 
the proximate cause principle benefit from some changes? 
 
For the benefit of the reader two fictional situations will be described to 
keep in mind when reading the thesis. These examples will be used later in 
the thesis to demonstrate the different results depending on causal principle.  
 
- In the first example a ship runs aground causing damage to the hull. 
On the way to a port for reparations she meets bad weather causing 
the ship to sink. The grounding and the bad weather are insured 
under different policies. 
 
- In the second example a ship runs into a mine. The mine causes a 
hole in the hull of the ship. Later the ship is running into bad weather 
causing the ship to sink. The mine is considered as a war peril, 
insured under a war policy while the weather, a marine peril, is 
insured under a marine policy.  
 
This thesis will not deal with questions of doctrine of good faith e.g. when 
the assured has given the underwriter incorrect information relevant to the 
peril causing the loss. Neither wills the thesis concern the situation where 
part of the loss occurs because of the ship being unseaworthy at the time of 
the loss or loss due to delay. These delimitations have been necessary to 
keep the thesis focused. 
 
Developments for Nordic countries, other than Norway, have been left 
outside the scope of the thesis. However, the Nordic countries have different 
legal systems wherefore there are differences in the development of marine 
insurance in general. The reason for excluding other Nordic countries is that 
the Norwegian development is interesting for the Nordic Plan while the 
other national legislation has affected the Nordic Plan less. It is also 
important to emphasise that the Nordic Plan is based on the Norwegian Plan 
which also lessens the influence of the other Nordic countries.   
1.3 Method and material 
In chapters two and three a legal dogmatic method will be used, meaning 
that relevant legal sources will be investigated to clarify the legal position.
11
 
In these chapters the English and Nordic marine insurance in relation to 
causation will be described and interpreted to provide the basis for the 
                                                 
11
 Wahlgren Peter, ‟Syfte och nytta med rättsvetenskapliga arbeten‟, SvJT, 2002 s.293, p. 
299-300 
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chapters following. The findings in the two descriptive chapters will be 
compared to find similarities and differences between the two systems. In 
the comparative analysis some benefits and disadvantages with the two 
systems will be lifted forward.  
 
The materials will mainly consist of legislation, articles, books and case 
law. In regard of the English system case law and books from well-known 
scholars constitutes a predominant part.  
 
Material relating to the Nordic Plan is not as rich as the material relating to 
English law, partly because the Nordic Plan entered into force recently. 
However, the Nordic Plan is based on the Norwegian Plan and the principles 
of causation has not been changed to any great extent wherefore books, 
articles and case law on the Norwegian Plan is still relevant and will be used 
to a great extent. 
 
Relevant for the Nordic Plan is also the extensive commentaries 
accompanying the Nordic Plan. As in interpretation of legislation in the 
Nordic legal tradition, the Commentary is used as an important source of 
law even if the text of the legislation would supersede in the case of a 
disparity.  
 
Cases law is considered as an important source of law in both the Nordic 
tradition and in the English tradition. However, it is only under the English 
system that the precedencies are formally binding which gives case law 
another weight. However, in the Nordic countries case law is relevant and 
even if case law is not formally binding it is unlikely that a principle stated 
in case law would not be followed in subsequent cases.
12
 
1.4 Scheme of thesis 
Following this introduction chapter is firstly a chapter describing the causal 
expression used under English law. This chapter mainly concerns the 
proximate cause principle and its development. 
 
Secondly, a chapter describing the approach in the Nordic Plan will follow. 
In this chapter the application of the apportionment rule will be investigated 
together with its development. In addition, the chapter will bring forward 
other causal expressions used in the Nordic Plan e.g. the modified dominant 
cause principle. 
 
Thirdly, a chapter comparing the two systems is undertaken. The chapter 
provide a discussion of benefits and disadvantages for the different ways of 
handling causation, mainly in relation to the main principles of proximate 
cause principle and apportionment principle. 
 
                                                 
12
 Bogdan Michael, Komparativ rättskunskap, Norstedts Juridik, 1993, p. 118 
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Fourthly, a chapter analysing how the proximate cause doctrine has 
developed under two other common law jurisdictions, Canada and Australia. 
The chapter also bring forward how the causal expressions are affecting the 
market together with the question if there is a need to change the proximate 
cause principle. 
 
Finally, a conclusion of the findings of this thesis will be presented.  
 14 
2 English System 
2.1 Proximate cause 
The English legal system applies the proximate cause principle and for the 
assured to be indemnified under the marine insurance policy two issues need 
to be established. Firstly, the loss needs to be proximately caused by an 
insured peril. Secondly, the peril should not be excluded or excepted under 
the insurance policy.  
 
The Marine insurance Act states that the proximate cause shall be decisive 
and section 55(1) reads as follows: 
 
Subject to the provision of this Act, and unless the policy otherwise provides, 
the insurer is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, 
but subject as aforesaid, he is not liable for any loss which is not proximately 
caused by a peril insured against. 
 
The Marine Insurance Act does not provide an answer to how the proximate 
cause should be defined. 
 
Case law has historically distinguished between proximate and remote cause 
of loss by their order in time by referring to Bacon‟s maxim: 
 
it were infinite for the law to judge the cause of causes, and their impulsions 
one of another; therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause and 
judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree.
13
 
 
Hence, proximate cause was considered as the cause last in time before the 
occurrence.
14
 The events leading up to the loss was therein viewed as a 
chain of causes where the last cause was to be considered as the proximate 
cause.
15
 In Pink v Fleming (1890) 25 QBD 396 the court held that it was 
only the last cause which was relevant since if not for the last cause the 
event as a whole would not have occurred.  
 
In Pink v Fleming
16
 the goods were insured against damage caused by 
collision. During the voyage the ship collided with another ship and was 
forced to undertake repairs. In order to undertake the repairs it was 
necessary to discharge the goods and the goods were later shipped to its 
final destination. When the goods arrived it was found that the goods had 
been damage by the handling during the discharge necessary for the repairs 
and by delay which occurred later in time. The assured sought compensation 
under the insurance policy. The Court of Appeal held that the collision was 
                                                 
13
 Bennet, supra note 6, p. 303 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Hodges Susan, Law of marine insurance, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1996, p. 146 
16
 (1890) 25 QBD 396 
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not the proximate cause since it was not last in time wherefore the assured 
could not recover. 
 
Today the courts have another approach to the identification of the 
proximate cause i.e. the traditional view on the proximate cause as the one 
latest in time has been abandoned.
17
 In Reishcher v Borwick (1894) 2 QB 
548, CA the Court of Appeal did not use time to determine the proximate 
cause but did instead consider the predominant cause of loss.
18
 In the 
leading case of Leyland Shipping v Norwich Union [1918] AC 350 
theHouse of Lords rejected the view that the proximate cause was the cause 
latest in time and instead confirmed the principle established in Reishcher v 
Borwick
19
. 
 
In Leyland Shipping
20
 a vessel was insured under a policy covering loss by 
perils of the sea but with a clause excluding “all consequences of hostilities 
or warlike operations”. The ship, Ikaria, was heading to Le Havre when a 
German submarine torpedoed her. The torpedo caused severe damage but 
with the assistance of tugs she could reach Le Havre and mooring at a quay. 
When Ikaria was still at the quay a gale made her bump against the quay 
making the harbour authority worried that she might sink and therein block 
the quay. The harbour authority ordered Ikaria to either be beached outside 
the harbour or moor inside the breakwater since the quay was needed for 
military purposes. This was a reasonable measure by the harbour authority 
considering the circumstances and Ikaria had to obey even if it might have 
been possible for her to be saved if she stayed at the quay. Ikaria moored 
inside the breakwater where she remained for two days. Because of the 
damage made by the torpedo she went aground with every ebb tie and 
refloat with the flood which weakened her. Hence she broke her back and 
the shipowners claimed compensation for loss by perils of the sea. The 
underwriters contested the claim and claimed that the loss was due to a war 
risk which fell under the exception. 
 
The House of Lord held that the proximate cause was the torpedo and not 
the repeated groundings as claimed by the assured. Consequently, the 
underwriters were not held liable to pay compensation since they were 
protected by the exclusion. Lord Shaw explained that causation is to be 
viewed as a net rather than a chain and that it is for the judges too, based on 
the facts, decide which cause is the proximate cause.
21
 The proximate cause 
could, however, still coincide with the latest in time but not necessarily.
22
 
The ruling in the Leyland Shipping
23
 has been confirmed by later cases.
24
 
                                                 
17
 Gilman Jonathan, Arnould’s law of marine insurance and average, 17th ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2008, p. 900 
18
 Hodges,supra note 15, p. 146; 
Also, Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [2004] 2 Lloyd‟s Rep 604 
19
 (1894) 2 QB 548, CA 
20
 [1918] AC 350 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Bennet, supra note 6, p. 304 
23
 [1918] AC 350 
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In the later case Samuel (P) & Co Ltd v Dumas[1924] AC 431 House of 
Lords held that when the crew is scuttling the ship causing an inrush of 
water, the proximate cause is the scuttling and not the last cause i.e. peril of 
the sea. The later cause was the inevitable or likely consequence of the 
earlier cause and in such a situation it is likely that the court will find the 
first cause to be the proximate cause.
25
 
2.1.1 The common sense approach 
Several different words or synonyms has been used in an attempt to 
identifying the proximate cause e.g. “direct”, “direct caused” 26 , 
“dominant”27, “effective”28, “predominant” or “real”. However, even if they 
can be used as guidance, most judges now agree that common sense should 
be used when determining the proximate cause.
29
  
 
In Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport (The 
Coxwould) 73 Lloyd’s List L. Rep. At 11 a ship stranded while sailing in 
convoy, the convoy was considered as a war operation. The stranding was 
because of a number of causes but there was no negligence in the navigation 
from the crew. It was held by their Lordships that the warlike operation was 
the proximate cause for the stranding. In regard of the common sense rule 
Lord Wright held that: 
 
To choose the real and efficient cause from out of the whole complex facts 
must be applying common sense standard … the test to be used is that it must 
be looked into as a man in the street would understand.
30
 
 
The common sense rule has been confirmed in subsequent cases.
31
 
 
However, the common sense rule can be hard to apply since common sense 
is a matter of opinion and opinions may diverge.
32
 This was also pointed out 
by Lord Brightman “My Lords, questions of causation are mixed questions 
of fact and law and opinions may and often do differ upon them.“ 33 
Nevertheless the common sense rule might still constitute the best 
                                                                                                                            
24
 E.g. Board of Trade v Hain SS Co [1929] AC 534, HL; Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd 
v Minister of War Transport (The Coxwould) 73 Lloyd‟s List L. Rep. 
25
 Peter MacDonald Eggers, Unpublished lecture notes from University Collage London, 
2006, p. 1 
26
 Becker, Gray and Co v London Assurance Corpn [1918] AC 101 
27
 (1863) 14 CB (NS) 259 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Hodges, supra note 15, p. 150 
30
 (1942) 73 Ll. L. Rep. 1 
31
 E.g. Heskell v Continental Express Ltd (1949-50) 83 Ll. L. Rep. 438; Gray v Barr [1971] 
2 Lloyd's Rep. 1; Llyods TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyds Bank Group 
Insurance Co Ltd [2002] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 113 
32
 Gilman, supra note 17, p. 902 
33
 Shell International Petroleum Co Ltd v Gibbs [1983] 2 A.C. 375 
 17 
alternative and it could also be the most reliable measure in determine the 
proximate cause.
34
  
2.1.2 Contractual freedom 
From section 55(1) of the Marine Insurance Act it can be understood that 
the parties enjoy freedom of contract i.e. the test of proximate cause has to 
be based upon the intention of the parties as expressed in the insurance 
policy.
35
 The court interprets the wording of the contract as the meaning 
they would have conveyed to a reasonable shipowner or insurer who is 
contracting in the commercial marine market.
36
 
 
Lindley LJ held in Reisher v Borwick
37
 that the proximate cause test:  
 
is based on the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract into which 
they have entered; but the rule must be applied with good sense, so as to give 
effect to, and not defeat those intentions. 
 
Various standard contracts have used different causative expressions to 
describe what perils qualify under the insurance policy. These expressions 
will in most cases be considered as requiring the loss to be proximate caused 
by the peril. The court has interpreted e.g. “caused by”38, “results from”39, 
“consequences thereof” 40  and “arising from” 41  as to prescribe the 
application of the proximate cause principle.
42
 
 
In other cases it has been held that the cause does not need to be the 
proximate cause for the assured to recover under the policy. “Directly or 
indirectly caused by” 43  and “caused or contributed to by” should be 
interpreted as to not demand the insured peril to be the proximate cause of 
loss.
44
  
2.2 Concurrent Proximate causes  
In many cases there are more than one cause for the loss which might make 
it difficult for the court to decide which one is the proximate cause and even 
more so if several causes seems equally blameable.
45
 In Wayne Tank & 
                                                 
34
 Hodges, supra note 15, p. 150 
35
 Hardy Ivany, E.R., General Principles of Insurance Law, 6
th
 ed,  Butterworths, 1993,  p. 
406 
36
 Bennet, supra note 6, p. 302 
37
 (1894) 2 QB 548, CA 
38
 Seashore Marine S.A. v Phoenix Assurance plc (The Vergina) (No. 2) [2001] 1 Lloyd‟s 
Rep 298 
39
 Llyods TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyds Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd 
[2002] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 113 
40
 Ionides v Universal Marine Insurance Co (1863) 14 CB (NS) 259 
41
 Coxe v Employers Liability Assurance Corp Ltd [1916] 2 KB 629 
42
 MacDonald Eggers, supra note 25, p. 2 
43
 Coxe v Employers Liability Association Corp Ltd [1916] 2 K.B. 629 
44
 MacDonald Eggers, supra note 25, p. 2 
45
 Bennet, supra note 6, p. 309 
 18 
Pump Co Ltd v Employers Liability Assurance Corp Ltd [1973] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep. 237 Lord Denning opened for the situation where several causes can be 
considered as proximate in the same case i.e. concurrent proximate causes. 
The possibility for the court to find several proximate causes was later 
confirmed in the JJ Lloyd Instruments v Northern Star Insurance Co (The 
Miss Jay Jay)[1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 32 
 
The tendency in English courts is to try to find one proximate cause rather 
than concurrent causes. Nevertheless, Bennet argues that the proximate 
cause test should be applied in a neutral fashion where the courts should not 
favour either finding one proximate cause or several proximate causes.
46
 
Potter L.J held in Handelsbanken ASA v Dandridge (The Aliza Glacial) 
[2002] C.L.C. 1227; 
 
Nonetheless, whenever an argument as to causation arises in respect of rival 
causes contended for under a policy of insurance, the first task of the court is 
to look to see whether one of the causes is plainly the proximate cause of the 
loss ... It is only if the court is driven to the conclusion that there was 'not one 
dominant cause, but two causes which were equal or nearly equal in their 
efficiency in bringing about the damage', one being a peril and the other an 
exception, that the exception prevails. 
 
However, other case law has expressed opposite view, Cairins L.J. held in 
the Wayne Tank
47
 that:  
 
I do not consider that the court should strain to find a dominant cause if, as 
here, there are two causes of which can properly be described as effective 
causes of the loss.
48
 
 
Although English courts traditionally try to find one proximate cause, it is 
now accepted that there can be more than one proximate cause however is 
not clear how the courts should reach such a conclusion.
49
 
2.2.1 One included loss and one not expressly 
excluded 
When the law recognises the possibility for several proximate causes the 
question arises what happens if one loss is covered by the policy while one 
is not. The situation of at least one included loss and where none of the 
causes is expressly excluded will first be examined.  
 
In Miss Jay Jay
50
 a yacht sank because it was unseaworthy (not covered 
peril) and because of the sea conditions (an insured peril). The underwriters 
were held liable and L.J Lawton stated:  
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It now seems to be settled law, at least as far as this court is concerned, that, 
if there are two concurrent and effective causes of a marine loss, and one 
comes within the terms of the policy and the other does not, the insurers must 
pay.
51
 
 
Bennet explains the reasoning by saying that the loss is covered by the 
insurance even if there are several causes to the loss. At the same time there 
is nothing in the policy that denies cover.
52
 Consequently, as long as no 
cause is expressly excluded it is not important to settle if there is one or 
several proximate causes.
53
 
2.2.2 One included loss and one expressly 
excluded loss 
Another situation that could arise when there are several proximate causes is 
that one of the losses is covered by the policy while another is expressly 
excluded. For a long time it was not possible to find any authoritative case 
on this situation even if there were several cases discussing it dicta.
54
 
 
In the Wayne Tank
55
, a non-marine case, the question was if the proximate 
cause to a fire was the negligently installed equipment or if the proximate 
cause was that the system was switched of and left unattended when it was 
not properly tested. It was said by Lord Denning that when there are two 
proximate causes and one is excluded by an exception the underwriters can 
rely on the exception. He continued by arguing that the particular exception 
takes priority over the general words since “general works always have to 
give way to particular provisions.”56 
 
In the same case Lord Roskill quoted a passage by Lord Sumner in P. 
Samuel & Co Ltd v Dumas
57
: 
 
Where a loss is caused by two perils operating simultaneously at the time of 
loss and one is wholly excluded because the policy is warranted free of it, the 
question is whether it can be denied that the loss was so caused, for if not the 
warranty operates.
58
 
 
Cairns L.J. held in the Wayne Tank
59
 that when there are two proximate 
causes of which one is excluded the assured can not recover. Lord Denning 
M.R. and Roskill L.J. on the other hand held that there was only one 
proximate cause but both supporting the view that if there would have been 
two proximate causes where one were excluded the assured would not be 
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able to recover. The reasoning in Wayne Tank
60
 has been followed in 
subsequent cases e.g. Miss Jay Jay
61
 and Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Ins 
Co S.A.K [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 803.  
 
The principle from the Wayne Tank
62
 is applicable when the court has found 
more than one proximate cause to the loss and one cause is expressly 
excluded by the policy. Additionally, the principle is applicable when there 
is only one proximate cause but when that cause can be interpreted in 
different ways of which one is excluded under the policy.
63
 A third situation 
in which the principle from Wayne Tank is applicable is when an exclusion 
is provided by law, however this situation was settled before the Wayne 
Tank
64
.
65
 
2.2.3 More than two proximate causes 
The courts have yet not had the reason to consider if more than two causes 
can be the proximate cause. However, there is no reason to believe that it 
would be impossible to find such a situation and courts would most likely 
apply the Wayne Tank principle.
66
 
2.3 Succession of proximate causes 
In the situation of successive causes of loss the court can find either one 
proximate cause or several proximate causes. However, there are no exact 
rules to determine if a loss is covered under the policy other that that the 
common sense rule i.e. there are no special rules for how to determine 
successive causes of loss.
67
 
 
However, there are a few points that can be made. When the first cause, 
covered by the policy, leads to an excluded peril which then leads to a loss 
the loss is likely to be covered. On the other hand, when the first cause is an 
excepted peril which leads to a loss that loss is not likely to be covered. 
Consequently, it is important to determine what is the first cause and if that 
cause inevitably leads to the second loss or if it was a separate new cause.
68
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2.4 Paramount clauses 
Some clause in English marine insurance are referred to as paramount 
clauses which means that they override other provisions. These clauses exist 
to clarify that if there is a conflict between a paramount clause and any other 
provisions of the insurance policy the paramount clauses shall prevail. 
Examples of paramount clauses are the War Exclusion, the Strike Exclusion 
and the Radioactive Contamination Exclusion of the IHC(01/11/03).
69
 
 
In regard of war and strike perils IWSC(H) states that loss is coved if the 
loss is “caused by” e.g. war, torpedoes or strikes. “Caused by” has been 
interpreted by the courts to be mean “proximately caused by”.70  
 
If there only is one proximate cause the paramount clause will not affect the 
application of the proximate cause principle. However, if there are two 
proximate causes where one peril is insured under the policy while the other 
is excluded in a paramount clause the assured will not be able to recover 
under this policy, similar to expressed exclusions according to the Wayne 
Tank principle.
71
 
 
The difference between an expressed exclusion and a paramount clause is 
that a paramount clause exclude the peril under every clause of the contract 
i.e. the loss will not be recoverable under one clause while not under 
another, which can be the case for other exclusions.
72
 
 
In regard of radioactivity IHC(01/11/03) states that loss “directly or 
indirectly caused by or contributed to by or arising from”73 some specified 
perils shall not be covered by the insurance.
74
 From the wording of this 
clause, especially “indirectly caused by” it can be held that the proximate 
cause shall not be used in this situation. The paramount clause regarding 
radioactivity can therefore prevail even if it is not considered as a proximate 
cause of los.
75
 
2.5 Exceptions provided by the Act 
Other considerations have to be made in relation to section 55 of the Marin 
Insurance Act as well. Firstly, if the loss is attributable to the wilful 
misconduct of the assured the underwriter is not liable to compensate the 
damage.
76
 Secondly, the underwriter is not liable for loss proximately 
caused by delay.
77
 Delay is here only mentioned for the reader to be aware 
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of but will not be examined further. Thirdly, according to section 55(2)(c) 
the underwriter is not liable for loss of:  
 
ordinary wear and tear, ordinary leakage and breakage, inherent vice or 
nature of the subject-matter insured, or for any loss proximately caused by 
rats or vermin, or for any injury to machinery not proximately caused by 
maritime perils.
78 
 
From the wording of the clause it can be understood that the proximate 
cause still is the relevant causal expression. However, the question arises if 
the clause should be read as an exclusion or as clarifying the scope of cover 
provided by the policy.
79
 
 
In HIH Casualty & General Insurance LTD v Waterwall Shipping Inc 
(1998) 146 FLR 76, an Australian case, it was argued dicta that the clause 
should not be interpreted as an exclusion but rather as limiting the scope of 
cover.
80
 If the clause would be considered as an exception the Wayne Tank 
principle means that compensation will be denied if any of the provisions of 
section 55(2)(c) is one of several proximate cause, provided that the policy 
did not cover such a peril. 
2.5.1 Wilful misconduct and negligence 
Wilful misconduct includes both intentional and reckless acts. However, 
negligence and gross negligence are outside the scope of wilful misconduct. 
This means that if nothing else is agreed the underwriter has to stand the 
risk of the assured‟s negligence An example of wilful misconduct is if the 
shipowner deliberately do not avoid a vessel which the shipowner knows is 
hostile, in an attempt to get the vessel captured.
81
 
 
Wilful misconduct can be held as the proximate cause. In P. Samuel & Co 
Ltd v Dumas
82
 it was held that the loss was proximately caused by wilful 
misconduct of the shipowner wherefore the underwriter was not held liable 
to compensate. Since their Lordships held wilful misconduct as the 
proximate cause there was no reason to examine the causal expression 
“attributable to”.83 
 
When wilful misconduct is considered as the proximate cause the 
underwriter will not be held liable to compensate. Firstly, due to the fact that 
wilful misconduct can never be a covered peril. Secondly, there is a general 
principle of law that a man cannot take advantage of his own wrong. For 
these reasons it is reasonable to believe that “attributable to” should mean 
                                                 
78
 Marine Insurance Act, Sec. 55(2)(c) 
79
 Bennet, supra note 6,  p. 314 
80
 Ibid. 
81
 Ibid, pp. 255-256 
82
 [1924] A.C. 431 
83
 Hodges, supra note 15,  p. 155 
 23 
something else than “proximately caused”, since the provision otherwise 
would be superfluous.
84
 
 
In the Australian case Wood v Associated National Insurance Co Ltd [1985] 
1 QdR 297 the shipowner left the ship in severe weather to a crew that was 
not competent, this was considered as wilful misconduct and the assured 
could not recover. In many cases however the assured is not directly 
involved as in Wood v Associated National Insurance Co Ltd
85
 but rather 
induce the master or crew to e.g. scuttle the ship. The planning of the 
scuttling cannot however be considered as the sole proximate cause to carry 
out the plan.
86
 
 
The assured‟s actions can be even more remote and still fall under 
“attributable to” e.g. if the assured tell the master that it would be beneficial 
if the ship sank and it is then for the master to plan and execute the plan. 
The doctrine of proximate cause might even have considered such an action 
of the assured to be to remote, however the term “attributable to” makes it 
possible to bind the assured to the loss with the consequence that the 
underwriter will not be held liable to compensate for the loss.
87
 
 
In, for example, ITCH and IHC there are also provisions regulating that the 
insurance only cover provided that the loss has not arisen from want of due 
diligence by the assured, owner or master. This provision is only applicable 
in respect of certain perils e.g. loading, discharging, latent defects and 
negligence of repairers.
88
 The proximate cause rule shall be read into the 
expression “caused by”.89 
2.6 Burden of proof 
Burden of proof contains two parts. Firstly, the production of evidence that 
refers to the burden to find evidence enough to support the case. During the 
trial this burden can shift e.g. when one party has produced a prima facie 
case. Secondly, the burden of persuasion that consists of the burdened party 
tries to find arguments for his case. The burden of persuasion stays with the 
burden party.
90
 
 
Firstly, the assured need to, on a balance of probabilities, prove that the loss 
was caused by a peril insured under the policy. Secondly, the assured needs 
to prove that the event was the proximate cause of loss or the other causative 
expression provided in the situation.
91
 When the policy covers “all risks” the 
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burden of proof for the assured eases and the assured needs only to, on a 
balance of probabilities, prove that the cause of the loss was accidental.
92
 
However, “all-risk” cover is not available for hull insurance.93 
 
The underwriters are not liable to prove a positive case but in reality this 
often happens e.g. to establish an excluded peril as the proximate cause of 
loss instead of a covered peril.
94
 In Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds (The 
Popi M) [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1 Lord Brandon explained: 
 
Although it is open to underwriters to suggest and seek to prove some other 
cause of loss, against which the ship was not insured, there is no obligation 
on them to do so. Moreover, if they chose to do so, there is no obligation on 
them to prove, even on a balance of probabilities, the truth of their alternative 
case.
95
 
 
However, the underwriters normally need to prove that a loss was 
covered by an excepted peril.
96
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3 Nordic System 
3.1 Nordic Marine Insurance Plan 
The Nordic countries have a common legal tradition and there are 
substantial similarities between the legal systems in the area of marine 
insurance. Still, each country has its own courts and legal rules. 
Traditionally, the primary source of marine insurance has in Norwegian 
been the Norwegian Plan, in Sweden the Swedish Plan and in Denmark the 
Danish Convention. The situation has been a bit different in Finland since 
there is no Plan or Convention as in the other Nordic countries.
97
  
 
The 1
st
 of January 2013 a common marine insurance plan for the Nordic 
countries entered into force. The Nordic Plan is based on the Norwegian 
Plan of 1996, version 2010 and therefore much of the Nordic Plan can be 
recognised from the Norwegian Plan. A novelty in the Nordic Plan is that 
the English text shall prevail although the Nordic Plan will be available in 
all the Nordic languages.
98
 
 
Extensive commentaries are complementing the text of the Nordic Plan. The 
Commentary is an integral part of the Nordic Plan and is considered to a 
great extent in the interpretation of the text of the Nordic Plan. However, if 
there is any disparity between the Commentary and the text the text shall 
prevail.
99
 
 
In the Commentary there are also references made to the Norwegian Plan 
and its Commentary, this is due to the fact that the Nordic Plan is based on 
the Norwegian Plan. Many principles have remained the same even if 
differences in both the text and the Commentary occur. For the question of 
causation many principles from the Norwegian Plan are still relevant 
wherefore the development and precedencies concerning the Norwegian 
Plan will be considered. 
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3.2 General rule for the causal expression 
It is stated in the Nordic Plan that there needs to be a causal connexion 
between the insured peril and the loss i.e. the loss has to be caused by an 
insured peril.
100
 The Nordic Plan does not specify what kind of causal 
connection is required but merely states that a causal connection is 
necessary.
101
 Under Norwegian insurance law the normal practise is to use 
the dominant cause principle, which is well established though case law. 
Under this principle the entire loss shall be allocated to the policy under 
which the dominant cause is insured i.e. the underwriter will have to 
compensate for “everything or nothing”.102 
 
However, under Norwegian marine insurance another principle has 
developed. Since the 1930s the principle of apportionment has been used i.e. 
the loss shall be apportioned between the relevant causes contrasting to 
“everything or nothing” under the dominant cause principle. 103  Another 
principle has developed in regard of the combination of war and marine 
perils, the modified dominant cause principle.
104
 
3.2.1 Development of the apportionment 
principle 
The apportionment principle in marine insurance has been established 
contrary to the causal expression used in general Norwegian insurance law 
and international law. In order to understand the reasons for this the 
development of the apportionment principle will be described.  
 
The starting point in Norwegian insurance law is the dominant cause 
principle and this principle was practised in the Norwegian Plan until the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century. During World War I many cases occurred 
where the court had to decide if loss was attributable to war perils or marine 
perils e.g. combination of navigational errors and deviations to avoid mines, 
or when ships sailing in convoys meet bad weather. The shipowner was in 
most cases insured against both war and marine perils but often under 
different policies, this made it necessary for the court to decide the dominant 
cause.
105
 In the leading case ND 1916.209 Skotfors it was held that the entire 
loss was attributable to the dominant cause.
106
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In Skotfors
107
 a ship went aground outside Orkney islands. The reason was 
partly that the navigator had misjudged the steam and partly because of a 
lighthouse that had been closed down because of the war. The entire loss 
was attributed to the marine peril. The court held: 
 
En ulykkes aarsaksforhold er ikke sjelden sammensat av skadelige 
indvirkninger av forskjellig art. Men det vil regelmæssig være en enkelt av 
disse faktorer, som for den almidelige opfatning bestemmer ulykkens væsen, 
nemligen den faktor, som anses for at være hovedaarsaken til ulykken.
108
 
109
 
 
Case law regarding the combination of war and marine perils from this time 
was often weighted in benefit for the war underwriter. There needed to be a 
strong element or dominance of the war peril for the court to consider this 
peril as dominant. If there were any fault such as navigational errors or other 
mistakes from the crew of significance the entire loss would be allocated to 
the marine underwriter with the consequence that he was held liable for the 
loss in its entirety.
110
 Subsequently, the marine underwriters had to bear a 
greater part of the increasing risks attributed to the war situation.
111
  
 
During the 1930 revision of the Norwegian Plan the marine underwriters 
had a strong wish to appropriate the risk. The underwriters wanted a system 
where it was possible to find an alternative solution to dominant cause 
principle where all loss was attributed to one policy.
112
 The result was the 
apportionment rule.  
 
When there was a combination of causes contributing to the loss the 
apportionment rule made it possible to apportion liability between several 
perils. The apportionment was made against each perils legal significance. 
Consequently, the solution answered the wish of the underwriters and made 
it possible to take the specific circumstances of each case into 
consideration.
113
 The scope of the principle of apportionment in the revision 
of the Norwegian Plan 1930 was made general i.e. the principle was to be 
applied when nothing else was stated.
114
 
 
The number of litigations in relation to causation rose during World War II 
since it proved hard to predict the outcome of the apportionment principle.  
Many of these litigations were combinations of war and marine perils e.g. 
situations where Norwegian ships disappeared in German controlled waters. 
The increasing amount of litigations has been attributed to the difficulties to 
apply the apportionment rule, the problem was that the outcome of the cases 
                                                 
107
 ND 1916.209 
108
 Translation by the author: “a casualty is not rarely consisting of several perils of 
different nature. But it will regularly be one of these factors, that for the common 
perception deciding the nature of the accident, namely the factor, which has been perceived 
as the dominant cause to the accident” 
109
 Braekhus and Rein, citing the court in ND 1916.209 Skotfors, supra note 105,  p. 258 
110
 Wilhelmsen and Bull, supra note 3,  p. 109 
111
 Braekhus and Rein, supra note  105, p. 259 
112
 Ibid. 
113
 Wilhelmsen and Bull, supra note 3, p. 110 
114
 Braekhus and Rein, supra note 105,  p. 260 
 28 
was strongly based on the specific circumstances of every case. Under the 
dominant cause principle it had been possible to find some typical situations 
leading to one result or another, which was harder under the apportionment 
rule.
115
 
 
By the 1964 reversion of the Norwegian Plan the dominant cause principle 
in a modified version was taken back into the Norwegian Plan in regard of 
loss caused by a combination of war and marine perils. For other 
combinations of perils, i.e. other than the combination of war and marine 
perils, the apportionment principle was kept. The apportionment principle 
was kept since it had become a part of the Norwegian legal system and even 
if it was rarely used in court it was used in practical settlements.
116
 
 
With the aim at reaching national, and international, unification in regard of 
causation it was proposed during the revision of the Norwegian Plan in 1996 
to change from the apportionment principle to the dominant cause principle. 
However, the proposal did not become a part of the Norwegian Plan and the 
principle of apportionment has followed into the Nordic Plan i.e. the Nordic 
Plan is based on the apportionment principle.
117
 
3.2.2 Combination of causes 
The Nordic Plan contains a clause regulating the situation of combination of 
causes. The clause reads as follows: 
 
If the loss has been caused by a combination of different perils, and one or 
more of these perils are not covered by the insurance, the loss shall be 
apportioned over the individual perils according to the influence each of them 
must be assumed to have had on the occurrence and extent of the loss, and 
the insurer shall only be liable for that part of the loss which is attributable to 
the perils covered by the insurance. 
 
If a peril that is excluded from cover in Cl. 2-8 (d) and Cl. 2-9, sub-clause 2 
(b), has directly or indirectly caused or contributed to the loss, the entire loss 
shall be attributed to that peril.
118
 
 
In this clause the apportionment rule is established as the causal principle in 
the situation of a combination of causes. The clause is general in scope and 
should be applied where there is a combination of different perils and one or 
more of the perils are not covered by the policy. However, the clause is not 
applicable when there are other contradicting clauses.
119
 
 
As can be read in the second paragraph the clause itself provide an 
exception, the so-called RACE II clause.
120
 Another exception stipulated by 
the Nordic Plan is the situation of a combination of war and marine perils 
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where another causal expression is used.
121
 The parties also have the 
discretion to include other provisions contradicting the clause into the 
specific policy.
122
 
 
According to the wording of the clause the apportionment rule is applicable 
when a combination of causes leads to the loss. There are various ways in 
which perils can work together and not all are covered by the clause. The 
clause is applicable when two causes operating together and therein causing 
the loss i.e. when both are necessary for the loss to occur while one of the 
causes would not be sufficient to cause the loss. 
 
For illustration, a ship is loaded unevenly causing the ship to tilt slightly but 
this alone would not constitute a problem. However, the ship is also 
constructed incorrectly which, together with the unevenly loading, causing 
the ship to sink. The construction error would not alone created the ship to 
sink i.e. the ship would not have sunk unless both causes was at hand. In 
this case, the underwriters would have been held liable for the loss caused 
by the incorrect loading but would not be liable for the construction error.
123
  
 
Another example is if the ship sinks because of both bad weather and 
defecting navigation. The loss would be allocated partly to the policy 
covering marine perils and partly to the assured since loss caused by breach 
of safety regulations are excluded in cl. 3-25 of the Nordic Plan.
124
 
 
The clause is also applicable when the causes working together as a chain of 
causes where the first cause is the reason, or is necessary, for the last cause 
to occur.
 125
 In Vestfold I ND 1977.38 a gear was breaking down because of 
mistakes made during a reparation of a previous grounding damage. The 
loss from the first incident was covered by the insurance, however the 
damage to the subsequent machinery was not. The question was if the was 
casualty between the grounding damage and further damage caused by the 
repair yard.  
 
The Supreme Court held that there was such causation and that the failure of 
the repair yard could not breach the chain of causation. Some of the loss was 
allocated to the mistake made by the repair yard and the Supreme Court 
distributed the loss with two thirds on the underwriters and one third on the 
assured, which he had to stand for.  
 
In addition, the chain of causation works when the first cause is triggering a 
second cause which causing loss.
126
 However, when two causes 
irrespectively of each other lead to different losses or different parts of the 
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loss the clause is not applicable. The different losses should here be 
allocated to the causes respectively.
127
  
3.3 Distribution of liability 
3.3.1 What perils should be included in the 
apportionment 
After settled that the loss is caused by a combination of causes the next step 
in applying the apportionment principle is to distinguish relevant from non-
relevant causes. It is only the causes of legal relevance that shall be taken 
into account since there otherwise could be an endless number of causes to 
which it is possible to trace the loss.
128
 
 
The loss has to been caused by a combination of perils for the 
apportionment principle to be applicable but even if a peril has been 
necessary in causing the loss it is possible that the underwriter can avoid 
liability. The court has the possibility to apportion a cause to zero per cent 
as well as to a 100 per cent. In other words, if a peril is considered as rather 
insignificant the court can apportion zero per cent of the loss to the peril 
meaning that the underwriter will not be held liable to compensate 
anything.
129
 The possibility to apportion zero or 100 per cent applies both in 
situations of combination of two causes
130
 and in a chain of causes
131
.
132
 
 
Examples of situations where one peril has been attributed with zero per 
cent and another with 100 per cent can be found in arbitration practise e.g. 
where a deviation has been made because of the war peril in combination 
with a marine peril. Here 100 per cent of the loss was allocated to the 
marine insurer, the deviation would only be considered relevant if the 
deviation would be unnatural also in peace time.
133
 Note that a modified 
dominant cause principle was inserted into the Norwegian Plan in 1969 
wherefore the result might have differed today.
134
 
 
The clause is applicable both in situations where two perils working 
together to cause a casualty as well as when the causes working together as 
a chain of causation. However, for a peril to be considered as having an 
effect on the loss the peril should have a bearing in the apportionment for 
about ten to fifteen per cent.
135
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3.3.2 How should the loss be allocated? 
When the court has established that a combination of causes has caused the 
loss, and which causes are of legal relevance, the question following is to 
what extent the specific causes has contributed to the loss. Case law on how 
the contribution should be done is not conclusive which makes it difficult to 
find any general principles. In principle, the contribution should be the same 
even if it regards two covered perils or one covered and one not covered 
peril. It is however possible that, in the situation of one uncovered peril, the 
courts would decide in favour of the assured.
136
 
 
In an attempt to analysing existing case law Braekhus and Rein identified 
three different situations. These situations are also referred to in the 
Commentary to the Nordic Plan as being of relevance.  
 
(1) The loss is a result of two objective concurrent perils causing the 
casualty. 
There are no later case law dealing with this situation but some cases 
from the first half of the 20
th
 century are still relevant. When 
reviewing these cases there seems to be a tendency that a greater part 
of the loss will be attributed to the cause later in time. For the cause 
earlier in time to be considered as more blameable that cause has to 
increase the likelihood of the loss i.e. the ship was forced to take a 
risk it would normally not do. There might also be a tendency to put 
greater weight to navigational errors than external causes.
137
 
 
(2) Several causes working together as a chain causing the loss.  
For example when after one casualty a new peril occurs causing 
further damage. The cause leading up to the loss will most likely be 
weighted heavier. This is also supported by Wilhelmsen and Bull 
who is referring to the Vestfold I
138
 to support their view
139
. 
However, existing case law does not give much guidance on how the 
damages actually should be divided.
140
 
 
Braekhus and Rein argues that the loss probably should be allocated 
depending on how likely it is that the first casualty will trigger the 
second peril causing the loss. The likelier the greater weight should 
be attributed to the first cause.
141
 
 
(3) The loss is a combination of risks covered by the insurance and 
subjective negligence. 
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An element of negligence can occur in both situations described 
under (1) and (2). In such a situation the apportionment rule is 
flexible since it does not need to invoke the assureds breach of duty 
in full, the apportionment rule work as a reduction system. It will 
serve both the underwriter and the assured when the assured do not 
loss his entire cover since there is a risk that the judge otherwise 
would favour the assured. The deduction will be based on an 
evaluation of probability i.e. depending on how likely it is that the 
fault will result in loss the higher the negligence will be weight in 
the apportionment.
142
 
 
In ND 1981.347 NA Vall Sun the situation concerned a combination 
of dereliction of duty and other causal factors. The Vall Sun wa s 
anchored in Pusan to be delivered for scrapping. Because of heavy 
wind anchor slipped and the Vall Sun collided with another ship, 
after which it stroke a harbour and a quay. The question was why the 
damage after the anchored had slipped was not prevented. A part of 
the loss, 25 per cent, was allocated to the assured because of the 
negligence. The underwriter was held liable to compensate for the 
remaining 75 per cent.
143
 
3.3.3 RACE II perils 
The Nordic Plan does not cover so-called RACE II perils, neither in regard 
of marine insurance nor war insurance.
144
 The RACE II perils consist of: 
 
1.ionising radiations from or contamination by radioactivity from any nuclear 
fuel or from any nuclear waste or from the combustion of  nuclear fuel,  
2.the radioactive, toxic, explosive or other hazardous or contaminating 
properties of any nuclear installation, reactor or other nuclear  assembly or 
nuclear component thereof,  
3.any weapon or device employing atomic or nuclear fission and/or fusion or 
other like reaction or radioactive force or matter, 
4.the radioactive, toxic, explosive or other hazardous or contaminating 
properties of any radioactive matter. The exclusion in this sub-clause does 
not extend to radioactive isotopes, other than nuclear fuel, when such 
isotopes are being prepared, carried, stored, or used for commercial, 
agricultural, medical, scientific or other similar peaceful purposes. 
5.any chemical, biological, bio-chemical, or electromagnetic weapon.
145
 
 
If a RACE II peril has indirectly, directly or contributed to the loss the entire 
loss shall be allocated to the RACE II peril.
146
 The reason for the exception 
is both to conform to the international market but also to adapt to the 
reinsurance market. The reinsurance market is not willing to cover any loss 
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deriving from these perils, neither on its own nor in combination with other 
perils.
147
 
3.4 Causal expression for war perils 
When a casualty is attributed partly to a war peril and partly to a marine 
peril the Nordic Plan contains special rules and the apportionment rule is not 
applicable, instead the main rule is the modified dominant cause rule is 
applied. The modified dominant cause rule appeared for the first time in the 
1964 reversion of the Norwegian Plan as a reaction of the high number of 
litigations in regard of the combination of war and marine perils during 
World War II.
148
 
 
When the apportionment rule was used the actual result of the loss was 
almost equally divided between the marine peril underwriters and the war 
perils underwriters. The modified dominant cause rule was therefore 
believed to give a similar effect but be more cost effective. It was also 
inserted to provide a higher degree of certainty since the cases would not, to 
the same extent, be depended on the specific circumstances of each case i.e. 
it would be easier to develop a precedency.
149
 
 
The modified dominant cause rule means that when a loss occurs as a 
consequence of a combination of marine and war perils the whole loss shall 
be deemed to have been caused by the dominant cause. However:  
 
if neither of the classes of perils is considered dominant, both shall be 
deemed to have had equal influence on the occurrence and extent of the 
loss.
150
  
 
Consequently, the courts should find the dominant cause of the loss and the 
entire loss will be allocated to the dominant peril. If there is doubt as to 
what cause is the dominant cause the loss should be divided equally.
151
  
 
As in combinations of causes other than war and marine perils the loss can 
be caused by both concurrent causes or a chain of causes leading up to the 
loss. The most common situation for war and marine perils are concurrent 
causes. The courts have to apply a strict objective evaluation to decide 
which peril had the greatest impact on the loss to determine the dominant 
cause.
152
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The courts should not regard whether the assured actually have insurance 
against war perils since the shipowner will have, or at least have had, the 
possibility to get such insurance.
153
 
3.4.1 When a cause considered as dominant 
There is some case law from the World War II that is relevant as guidance 
for when a peril is considered as dominant; it is from this possible to 
distinguish some atypical situations. The first situation concerns when there 
is an unlit lighthouse (war peril) and a navigational mistake (marine peril). 
The navigational mistake has in most situation been considered as the 
dominant cause but in one case the loss has been attributed equally between 
the two perils. If it is possible to attribute two thirds of loss to one cause this 
cause should be considered as dominant. 
 
Secondly, when a casualty occurs (a) while traveling in convoy and/or (b) 
traveling with blinded lanterns or (c) cover up of lights other than 
lighthouses the holdings of the courts varies to a great extent which makes it 
hard to find a specific pattern. In the ND 1989.263 NV Scan Partner the 
court held that because of the radar equipment available today the 
extinguish of the lights means less than before. Hence it is possible that this 
situation would have been considered differently today.  
 
Thirdly, when a deviation is made because of a war risk the loss will most 
likely be divided between the two perils. In ND 1942.406 VKS a ship went 
aground because it had followed a route different than the normal route due 
to the war risk, in times of peace it would not had went so close to land. 
Additionally, the chart was incorrect in the depth of the sea which 
contributed to the loss. The incorrect chart was a marine peril and the 
deviation was found to be a war peril. The court held that the loss would be 
divided equally between the two perils.
154
 
 
From the wording of the clause on the modified dominant cause rule it is 
clear that one cause needs to be dominant for this peril to bear all the loss, 
i.e. it is not enough that one cause is slightly more dominant. In the 
Commentary it is said that when the blame is split 60/40 between two 
causes this is probably the upper limit as for when loss should be divided 
equally.
155
 In a situation where one peril is blameable to 66 per cent the 
other peril would be blameable to 33 per cent. As a general statement, this 
means that second peril is only blameable to half of the first peril wherefore 
it would not be reasonable to not consider the first peril as dominant.
156
 
 
Some case law can be used as guidance for when a cause is considered as 
dominant. These cases are mainly from the time of the Iran-Iraq war in the 
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1980s. In NV Scan Partner
157
 a tanker, Barcelona, used as a storage vessel 
by Iran in the Persian Gulf, was attacked by Iraq. Another ship, Scan 
Partner, was participating in the work to save Barcelona. Several hours later 
there was an explosion on board Barcelona with the consequence that Scan 
Partner was covered in oil, which came to burn causing Scan Partner to 
become a total loss. The reason of the explosion was uncertain but it could 
have been a gas explosion, a bomb or a combination of the two.  
 
Scan Partner was insured under the Norwegian Plan. The arbitrational court 
held that it was not likely that the explosion was a consequence of a bomb 
and it was not enough that the ship was in a war zone for the war peril 
underwriter to be held liable. However, a part of the blame was of the war, 
i.e. the bombing of Barcelona, but when there is a chain of causation time 
and geographical proximity is highly relevant.  
 
In Scan Partner
158
 it was three days between the bombing and the total loss 
of Scan Partner. During this time many other things happened wherefore the 
dominant cause of the total loss of Scan Partner could not be the war peril. 
Another important part in the arbitrational court‟s reasoning was that Scan 
Partner was obliged to participate in the extinguishing of the fire because of 
their charter.
159
 
 
As evidenced by the Scan Partner
160
 it can prove difficult for the courts to 
know whether to apply the modified dominant cause rule in the first 
paragraph or the second paragraph and therein divide the damage equally. 
However, both the Commentary and Braekhus and Rein still advocate this 
rule as a better alternative than the apportionment rule for combinations of 
war and marine perils.
161
 
3.4.2 Losses entirely attributable to war perils  
When there is a combination of war and marine perils the modified 
dominant cause rule shall apply but there are an exception to this clause. In 
some situations war perils should always be considered as the dominant 
cause. Namely when; 
 
a. loss arising when the ship is damaged through the use of arms or 
other implements of war for war purposes, or in the course of military 
manoeuvres in peacetime or in guarding against infringements of 
neutrality, 
b. loss attributable to the ship, in consequence of war or war-like 
conditions, having a foreign crew placed on board which, wholly or 
partly, deprives the master of free command of the ship, 
c. loss of or damage to a life-boat caused by it having been swung out 
due to war perils, and damage to the ship caused by such a boat.
162
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Perils mentioned under sub-paragraph a. would in most cases constitute the 
dominant cause either way but this provisions makes sure that all such perils 
is deemed to be the dominant cause. However, the paragraph should only be 
used when the implement of war is the direct cause of loss, otherwise the 
modified dominant cause rule should be applied.
163
 
3.4.3 Loss attributable either to marine or war 
perils 
When it is not certain whether a loss is caused by a marine or a war peril 
and it is impossible to settle what peril was the reason the liability should be 
allocated equally between the underwriters. However, if there is more than 
60 per cent probability that one of the perils caused the loss that peril should 
be deemed to be the more probably cause. The underwriter of the blamed 
peril will have to compensate for the entire loss.
164
 
3.5 Intent and gross negligence  
In the Nordic Plan there is a general rule stating that if the assured 
intentionally causes the casualty the underwriter will not be held liable to 
compensate for the loss.
165
 Intent under the Nordic Plan shall be considered 
in the same manner as in criminal law and consists of situations when the 
assured deliberately brings about the casualty to receive compensation under 
the policy. This could be the situation of fraudulent intent when the assured 
understands that the casualty will occur as a consequent of his action.
166
 If 
the casualty is caused intentionally the underwriter can cancel the insurance 
contract without notice.
167
 
 
In ND 1985.126 NSC Birgo a ship had been sunk by purpose. In the first 
process the underwriter could not prove intent but the truth was later 
revealed when a member of the crew told about the sinking at a drinking 
party. The underwriters successfully claimed reimbursement for what they 
had earlier compensated. 
 
In the case of gross negligence of the assured the underwriter‟s liability shall 
be decided based on the specific circumstances and degree of fault.
168
 Gross 
negligence is more than negligence but less than intent and in the case of 
gross negligence liability shall be determined based on the circumstances of 
each case. If the cause of damage is gross negligence the reduction will be 
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progressive.
169
 If gross negligence is proved, the underwriter may cancel the 
insurance contract with a fourteen days‟ notice.170 
 
In ND 1971.350 NSC Kari-Bjørn a fishing vessel went aground and sunk. 
This was because the owner took commando over the ship after a 
disagreement between the captain and the charterer. Severe navigational 
errors were made and the court held that the owner must have sailed blindly 
and lacked all feeling of responsibility. The insurer had to pay 2/3 of the 
insured sum even if the assured‟s actions were considered as grossly 
negligent.  
 
Even if the assured has acted with intent or gross negligence he will not loss 
his cover if the assured on account of a mental disorder or otherwise was 
unable to judge his own actions. An exception is made for self-induced 
intoxication i.e. self-induced intoxication is never an excuse for intent or 
gross negligence.
171
 
 
The assured will neither lose his cover in the event he tries to save human 
life or salvaging goods of material value. The value of the material normally 
has to be substantial but if the assured was mistaken of the value he might 
be able to remain covered.
172
 
3.6 Burden of proof 
As in other areas of private law the general rule of burden of proof is that 
facts need to be established on a balance of probabilities, this is the starting 
point also in the Nordic Plan. “A balance of probabilities” means that it 
must be more likely than not that the issue at hand is true. The first 
paragraph of cl. 2-12 in the Nordic Plan states that, as expressed by the 
Commentary, that to make a claim under the Nordic Plan the assured has to 
establish that: 
 
- the assured has an insurable interest in the sense that he has suffered actual 
economic loss of the kind that is covered by the insurance in question,  
- the assured‟s economic loss has arisen from events (perils) of the kind 
specified in the relevant insurance,  
- that the loss occurred during the insurance period, and 
- the extent or quantum of the loss.
173
 
 
If the assured succeed in establishing these parts, the underwriter will have 
to prove, if relevant, the applicability of an exclusion clause. The assured on 
the other hand has to prove that the loss was not caused by a so-called 
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RACE II perils. If the Nordic Plan contains any provisions contradicting this 
main rule that provision should be applied instead.
174
 
 
For the assured the burden of proof eases when the cover is an “all risk 
cover” since the assured only need to prove that loss covered by the policy 
and the underwriter then has to prove that the peril causing the loss is 
excluded. This makes the assured‟s burden of proof easier compared to non-
marine insurance where the assured has to prove that the loss is caused by 
one of the specifically named perils in the policy.
175
 
 
The burden of proof relating to the situation when the assured has 
committed a breach of contract rests with the underwriter, but after the 
underwriter has established a prima facie case, the burden of proof might 
revert to the assured.
176
  
 
However, it must be differentiate between situation where it is clear that the 
assured has a valid claim, and established loss, but the question on hand is 
whether a underwriter is liable under insurance policy A or B. This could be 
the situation when it is not certain if a loss has been caused by a war or a 
marine peril.
177
  
 
In this situation “the more probable cause” should be attributed the loss 
which should be interpreted in the same way as “dominant cause” i.e. if 
more than 60 per cent is attributable to one cause this cause shall be deemed 
to be “the more probable cause”, otherwise the loss shall be attributed 
equally.
178
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4 Comparative analyses 
When a comparison is made between two legal systems one have to take the 
characteristics of each legal system into consideration. England is 
considered as a common law jurisdiction which means that much emphasis 
is given to case law. The Nordic system on the other hand is traditionally 
considered as a civil law jurisdiction which means that case law is given less 
weight.
179
 However, case law is used in the Nordic countries and lawyers 
are regularly using case law in their work but not to the same extent as is 
done under English law.  
 
A characteristic of the Nordic legal system is that the preparatory works are 
considered as an important source of law and the Commentary is used to a 
great extent in interpretation of the Nordic Plan. The preparatory works does 
not have the same legal position under English law.
180
  
 
Another important difference in marine insurance is that the Nordic Plan is 
based on an “all-risk cover” meaning that a risk is included as long as it is 
not excluded.
181
 In the English system “all-risk cover” is not available for 
hull insurance and therefore the English system builds on a system where a 
peril is only covered if it is specifically opted into the insurance policy i.e. a 
nominated perils system.
182
 This has an effect as to what perils are covered, 
in general the Nordic Plan offer a broader scope of cover compared to the 
English system.
183
 It also affects the burden of proof.  
 
The rules that will be compared in this chapter can often be change by the 
parties in the specific contract. When the parties have the discretion to 
negotiate different terms it makes the system more flexible and allow for the 
parties to adjust the policy to their preferences. However, in this comparison 
it is not possible to take such changes into account to any great extent, some 
standard contracts are however referred to as deviating from the provisions 
in the Marine Insurance Act. Instead, the rules compared will be the general 
or typical terms.  
 
In both the English and Nordic systems it is possible to consider several 
perils as causing the loss. Both systems also recognise that these causes can 
work together causing the loss either as concurrent causes or in a sequence 
of causes. The same principles are used in both situations and the court 
considers the specific situation to decide which perils are of legal 
significance. 
 
                                                 
179
 Bogdan, supra note 12, p. 118 
180
 Ibid.., p. 132 
181
 Wilhelmsen and Bull, supra note 3, p. 80 
182
 Thomas, supra note 1, p. 15 
183
 Extracted from mail correspondence with expert from a leading P&I Club 
 40 
Firstly the principles of the proximate cause rule and the apportionment rule 
will be compared, including various exceptions to these principles. 
Secondly, the modified dominant cause rule will be compared to the 
proximate cause rule. Thirdly, the system of war perils will be investigated. 
Finally, the burden of proof will be compared.  
4.1 Proximate cause rule and 
apportionment rule 
The principle of dominant cause used in general Norwegian insurance law is 
similar to the English proximate cause principle but the Norwegian 
development in marine insurance took another direction.
184
 The Norwegian 
rule came to change into an apportionment rule and the reason for this 
development was the complaints from the industry when it was noticed that 
the result of the dominant cause rule often seemed unfair.
185
  
 
However, what happened in return when the apportionment principle was 
used was that a high number of litigations appeared before the Norwegian 
courts. Another causal principle, the modified dominant cause principle, 
was therefore inserted in relation to the combination of marine and war 
perils.
186
 The Nordic Plan has kept the principle from the previous 
Norwegian Plan and therefore sets out an apportionment principle. Under 
English law the proximate cause principle is prescribed by the Marine 
Insurance Act but are also well established through case law. 
 
The proximate cause principle and the apportionment principle often lead to 
different results wherefore an example will serve well before discussing the 
principles further. Recall the first fictional situation given under the 
introduction where a ship first runs aground, insured by underwriter A, and 
later runs into bad weather, insured by underwriter B. This situation will 
first be considered in the light of the apportionment principle and later under 
the proximate cause principle. 
 
The apportionment rule applies when there are several causes for the loss 
but the court first has to settle which causes are of legal relevance. It is here 
assumed that both the grounding and the weather will have such relevance. 
Continue to assume that the grounding would be blameable for 60 per cent 
of the loss while the weather would be blameable for 40 per cent of the loss. 
The loss would in this case be apportioned by 60 per cent for the 
underwriter A and 40 per cent to underwriter B.
187
 
 
If the same case would be considered under the proximate cause principle 
the courts would first try to determine which was the proximate cause or 
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causes. In this example it is assumed that both the grounding and the 
weather would be considered as proximate causes and therefore the 
principle from Wayne Tank
188
 would be applicable. This means that if one 
of the perils is expressly excluded under the policy the assured would not be 
able to recover. If no such exception were in the policy the underwriter in 
question would be held liable to compensate for the loss in its entirety.
189
 
 
There are benefits and disadvantages with both results. One benefit with the 
apportionment rule is that it better reflects the actual reasons for the loss 
since the underwriter is only liable to compensate for the proportion of the 
loss attribute to the insured peril. Under the proximate cause rule the 
underwriter will be held liable for everything or nothing, which can include 
compensating for loss not sole attributable to the insured peril. That the 
compensation reflects the actual reasons for the loss also appeals for reasons 
of fairness. 
 
Another reason why the English system can seem unfair is the Wayne Tank 
principle.
190
 When the parties are negotiating a specific peril to be opted into 
the insurance policy the assured are assuming that the peril is covered. 
However, according to the Wayne Tank principle, the peril will not be 
covered if it appears in combination with an excluded peril. What the 
Wayne Tank principle does is that it is moving the focus from what actually 
is covered to what is excluded. Compared to the Nordic system where the 
assured will not be left entirely without cover in the case of an covered peril 
and one excluded peril the English system can come across as a bit 
unreasonable. 
 
There is another argument of fairness in favour of the apportionment rule. 
When the underwriters set the premiums they are calculated for a certain 
risk to be covered. There is no reasonable reason for the policy to cover 
perils other than the once the policy is intended to cover i.e. when there are 
several proximate causes it is not reasonable for an underwriter to cover the 
entire loss when the underwriter only agreed to cover a certain loss.
191
 
 
Since apportionment is not possible under the proximate cause rule the 
result in the decision of what constitute the proximate cause or proximate 
causes can be severe for the assured. Firstly, it is possible that only one 
cause is considered as proximate even if several causes is important in 
leading up to the loss, this could mean that the assured will be left 
uncovered. Secondly, even if several causes are considered as proximate but 
one is excluded the assured will be left without cover. Hence, slight 
differences can mean full cover or no cover at all for the assured.  
 
A similar problem can arise in the situation of the apportionment principle. 
If the court apportions a part of the loss to a non-covered peril the assured 
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will end up without cover for that part. However, the assured will not be in a 
situation of “everything or nothing”. It might be that it is a greater risk for 
the assured to be left partly without cover when the apportionment rule is 
used compared to the proximate cause rule. However, the risk for the 
assured to be left entirely without protection decreases with the 
apportionment rule. 
 
Whatever the result of the application of the proximate cause might be one 
of the foremost benefits with the proximate cause does not relate to the 
result in the specific situation. The benefit with the proximate cause rule is 
that it might be easier to create a precedency compared to the apportionment 
rule and foreseeability is important.
 192
 The proximate cause rule makes it 
easier to find typical situations for the application of the rule and when a 
precedency can be built up it increases the predictability. Such a precedency 
would in return make it easier for the parties to negotiate a policy that meet 
the intentions of the parties. 
 
One of the major criticisms against the apportionment rule is that it is hard 
to create a precedency. This depends on the fact that the application of the 
rule is strongly based on the specific circumstances of every case and it is 
therefore hard to find these typical situations. Hence the apportionment rule 
was changed in regard of combination of marine and war perils.
193
  
  
In conclusion, foreseeability is wishful in any legal rule. This foreseeability 
should however not give an unreasonable result. The same can be said in the 
opposite direction, legal rules should give room for the courts to adjust to a 
specific situation but legal rules have to be foreseeable. For the parties it is 
important that they can adjust their insurance contract to their intentions and 
a requirement for such a possibility is that the legal position is clear. 
4.2 Modified dominant cause rule and 
proximate cause rule 
In some situations the Nordic Plan prescribes a causal expression other than 
the apportionment rule e.g. the modified dominant cause rule used in 
situations of combination of marine and war perils. As the name suggest the 
rule contains some elements similar to the proximate cause rule but the 
modified dominant cause rule is only applicable in situations of combination 
of war and marine perils.
194
 
 
As with the proximate cause rule the loss shall be attributed in its entirety to 
the peril considered as the dominant cause. What different the rule from the 
proximate cause rule is that it also prescribes that in the situation where 
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none of the causes is consider as dominant the loss should be attributed 
equally between the two policies.
195
 
 
To illustrate the difference between the proximate cause rule and the 
modified dominant cause rule the second example as described in the 
introduction will be used. In this example a ship runs into a mine and later 
meet bad weather. Under the modified dominant cause rule this would have 
meant that if one of the perils was considered as dominant the entire loss 
would be allocated to this peril. However if neither of the perils was 
considered as dominate the loss would be apportioned equally i.e. 50/50 
between the perils, which would have meant that the underwriters would 
have had to pay half each.
196
 
 
If the same example were considered under the proximate cause rule the 
result would be the same in the situation where only one cause was 
proximate or dominant i.e. the entire loss would be attributed to this peril. In 
the situation with two proximate causes the Wayne Tank rule would be 
applied e.g. if an exception clause was included in policy, concerning one of 
the proximate causes, the loss would not be recoverable under the policy.
197
 
 
One problem with the proximate cause rule is that even if a loss only barely 
is considered as the proximate cause the entire loss will be allocated to this 
cause. The modified dominant cause rule is a compromise between the 
apportionment rule and the proximate cause rule. It gives the possibility to 
allocate the loss equally between two losses when it is difficult to decide 
which of the perils actually is the proximate cause or when several causes is 
considered as proximate. 
 
The benefit with the modified dominant cause rule is that it could be 
perceived as fairer at the same time as it is not as unpredictable as the 
apportionment rule. It would also respond to the criticism that even a small 
differences that makes the court weight one cause as proximate means that 
the assured could lose his entire cover. The modified dominant cause rule is 
only applicable in situations of combination of marine and war perils but 
might have answered to some criticism if it was used also in relation to the 
combination of different marine perils. In regard of the Nordic Plan to the 
uncertainty of the apportionment rule and in regard of the proximate cause 
to create a result better reflecting the actual reason for the loss. 
4.3 War perils 
War perils have gotten a specific status in both the English and the Nordic 
systems. In the Nordic system there are specific clauses relevant to the war 
perils with another causal expression as basis. Under the Marine Insurance 
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Act war perils are included in the notion of “maritime perils”198 however 
they are often excluded in paramount clauses in specific policies. 
 
There are differences in how the two systems are handling war perils. In the 
English system war perils are excluded in paramount clauses but the normal 
causal expression, the proximate cause, is used. Because of the Wayne Tank 
principle, in the situation of several proximate causes, the entire loss would 
render none recoverable under the marine policy if a paramount clause 
excepting war perils would be in the policy.
199
 
 
The Nordic Plan on the other hand provide for some special rules relating to 
war perils or the combination of war and marine perils. The Nordic system 
uses another causal expression for the combination of war and marine perils, 
namely the modified dominant cause.
200
 The Nordic Plan also point out 
some war perils specifically and these perils are always deemed to be the 
cause of the loss. The second example in the introduction where a mine was 
partly to blame for the loss would be such a peril i.e. the entire loss would 
be allocated to this peril.
201
 
 
Another difference is that the paramount clauses in the English system are 
not solely dealing with war perils but other perils can also be contained in 
these kind clauses e.g. radioactive contamination and strike.
202
 Therefore, 
the system of paramount clauses is not specific for war perils. 
 
For the underwriter insuring either war or marine perils it is of importance 
where the loss falls. If there is only one dominant or proximate cause the 
result will be the same under both systems, the underwriter insured the 
dominant peril will be held liable. In the situation of two dominant or 
proximate causes the war underwriter would be held liable under the 
English system, while under the Nordic system the loss would most likely 
be apportioned since none of the causes is considered as dominant. Some 
perils will under the Nordic system be deemed to be the dominant cause.
203
 
4.4 Radioactive contamination 
The Nordic Plan and the IHC(01/11/03) contains a provision which has the 
same wording. If a RACE II peril, or a peril according to cl. 31 of the 
IHC(01/11/03), is directly, indirectly or contribute to a loss the entire loss 
shall be attributed from such a peril.
204
 
 
Both systems deviate from their normal causal expressions since neither the 
proximate cause nor the apportionment rule is used. After ninth of 
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September 2011 no reinsurer was willing to reinsure against terrorism 
attacks. Hence, the clause concerning radioactive contamination was 
inserted into every reinsurance contract. The insurance market then included 
the same provision into the specific insurance policy.
205
 
 
Under the Nordic Plan it is usually possible to apportion the loss but in the 
case of radioactive contamination such apportionment it is not possible.
206
 
Because of the demands of the reinsurance market this clause seems to 
operate similar under the English and Nordic systems. 
4.5 Negligence and intent 
The assured will lose his cover under both the English and Nordic systems if 
he intentionally causes the loss he. The definition of intent seems however 
to differ a bit; in the English system recklessness is included in the concept 
of wilful misconduct which would not be the case of intent under the Nordic 
system.  
 
When the assured is acting with negligence the cover under the two systems 
can differ. The Marine Insurance Act does not regulate situations of 
negligence or gross negligence meaning that the underwriter has to stand the 
risk. However, in the ITCH and IHC there is a provision on due diligence 
which seems to be similar to ordinary negligence which states that the 
assured lose his cover if he is acting negligently in regard of certain perils. 
This exclusion covers only specific parts but the consequence for the 
assured is that he loses his entire cover. In practise the provision of wilful 
misconduct is therefore only relevant in situations not covered by the 
provisions in ITCH or IHC.
207
 
 
In the Nordic Plan there is a special rule for gross negligence where it is 
stated that compensation can be deducted depending on the circumstances of 
the case. In the case of ordinary negligence the underwriter will stand the 
risk. The Nordic Plan provide a more flexible approach since it is possible 
to take the serveries of gross negligence into account.
 208
 
 
The result in the first fictional situation given in the introduction would be 
that the assured loss his entire cover if the assured caused one of the perils 
intentionally or negligently, provided that the vessel was insured under 
ITCH or IHC. It is not possible to take the how severe the negligence is into 
account since loss cannot be apportioned under the English system. 
 
Under the Nordic Plan however the assured would lose his cover if the loss 
was caused intentionally. However, contrasting to the English system, the 
assured would not loss his cover in the event of ordinary negligence. In 
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regard of gross negligence the cover would be deducted depending on the 
circumstances of the case.  
4.6 Burden of proof 
Under both the English and Nordic system proof need to be established on a 
balance of probabilities i.e. it must be more likely than not that the facts are 
true. This is the main rule in not only marine insurance but also in general 
insurance law.  
 
In both systems the assured first need to establish that loss is suffered and 
that the loss was suffered by a peril covered by the policy. Under English 
law the assured also has to prove that the peril was the proximate cause, or 
other relevant causal expression, for the loss. The Nordic system differs, for 
natural reasons, and the assured only need to prove that the loss was 
suffered during the insurance period.  
 
The burden of proof for the assured ease significantly when the policy 
provide an “all risk cover” since the assured in this situation need only to 
prove that the risk was covered by the policy. Therefore, in general, the 
assured under the Nordic system will have an easier burden of proof since 
the Nordic system for marine perils, although not war perils, is based on a 
“all-risk cover”.  
 
The systems also have the same approach towards exceptions, it is for the 
underwriter to prove that the loss suffered was within an exception provided 
in the policy. However, under Norwegian law the assured need to prove that 
loss was not caused by a RACE II peril.
 209
 
 
Considering the eased burden of proof for the “all-risk cover” the assured 
will under the Nordic Plan, in general have an easier burden of proof. 
Otherwise the basic principles of burden of proof seems to be fairly similar 
as between the two systems. 
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5 Proximate cause outside 
England and its effects for 
the industry 
5.1 Proximate cause in other jurisdictions 
The proximate cause principle is used under English law but outside 
England the proximate cause principle has been subject of some criticism. 
There has been criticism claiming that the principle of proximate cause can 
seem random in its application. Criticism has also claimed it can seem 
unfair as to which underwriter will be held liable to compensate for the 
loss.
210
 
 
The English Marine Insurance Act has been used as a model around the 
commonwealth in developing national marine insurance acts.
211
 Legislators 
in Canada and Australia have looked at the English Marine Insurance Act 
when passing their legislation and in both states some criticism against the 
proximate cause has been brought forward. However, Australia seems to 
have kept the proximate cause principle while there in Canada has been 
some developments leading away from the traditional proximate cause 
principle.  
 
Firstly the developments in Canada will be presented and secondly some 
criticism brought forward in Australia will be discussed.  
5.1.1 Canada and the proximate cause rule 
5.1.1.1 C.C.R Fishing and Derksen 
In the C.C.R. Fishing Ltd v British Reserve Insurance Co. Ltd [1990] 1 
S.C.R. 814 and the Derksen v 539938 Ontario Ltd. et al [2001] 3 S.C.R. 398 
the Supreme Court of Canada restricted the application of the proximate 
cause and might have gone even further as to extinguish the proximate cause 
all together.
212
The two cases will be discussed together with some reasons 
                                                 
210
 E.g. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 814, Hillel David and Gary Caplan, ‟Serial and independent 
concurrent causes in insurance law‟, The Advocates’ Quartely, Vol. 36, Issue 1, 57-85, 
http://heinonline.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/aqrty36&page=57&
collection=journals, accessed 2013-04-17 
211
 James Allsop, Causation, Perils of the Seas and Inherent Vice in Marine Insurance 
(2011) 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/allsop200711.pdf
/$file/allsop200711.pdf, accessed 2013-04-17 p. 5 
212Saunders, Anthony J., „Proximate Cause in Insurance Law – Before and After Derksen‟, 
Advocates' Quarterly, 2006, Vol. 32, Issues 1 and 2, 140-166, 
http://heinonline.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/aqrty32&page=140
&collection=journals, accessed 2013-01-29, p. 2 
 48 
for the change from the proximate cause. Some attention will also be given 
to if it is likely with any further developments in the area of causation in 
Canada. 
 
In C.C.R. Fishing, a maritime case, the court found that there were two 
concurrent causes for the loss. The underwriter claimed that an exclusion 
clause was applicable and denied cover. The Supreme Court held that the 
loss did not fall within the exclusion clause wherefore the underwriter was 
held liable to compensate. McLachlin J remarked in regard of the proximate 
cause: 
 
I am of the view that it is wrong to place too much emphasis on the 
distinction between proximate and remote cause in construing policies such 
as this.  Generally speaking, the authorities do not follow such a course.  I do 
not read s. 56 of the Insurance (Marine) Act as limiting the cause of the loss 
to a single peril.  Realistically speaking, it must be recognized that several 
factors may combine to result in a loss at sea.  It is unrealistic to exclude 
from consideration any one of them, provided it has contributed to the loss.
213
 
 
In Derksen
214
 the court once again had to take two proximate causes into 
account. One of the causes of loss was an excluded risk under the insurance 
policy and in this situation the view has been that the entire loss will 
excluded from the policy i.e. the Wayne Tank principle. In Derksen
215
 
however it was held that loss attributed sole to the excluded peril would be 
excluded, if the policy did not say otherwise.
216
  
 
The parties can change the causal expression used by the court by contract 
since causal expressions ultimately is a matter of interpretation of the 
contract. In the Pavlovic v  Economical Mutual Insurance Co. (1994), 28 
C.C.L.I. (2d) 314 the parties had used exclusion clause as follows: 
 
We do not insure for such loss regardless of the cause of the exclude event, 
other causes of the loss, or whether other causes acted concurrently or in any 
sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss… 
 
The court held in the Derksen that an exclusion clause similar to the one 
used in the Pavlovic
217
 would have excluded liability under the insurance 
policy in the event of concurrent causes.
218
 
5.1.1.2 Criticism against the proximate cause 
McLachlin J criticised the proximate cause principle in the C.C.R. Fishing 
by stating: 
 
The question of whether insurance applies to a loss should not depend on 
metaphysical debates as to which of various causes contributing to the 
accident was proximate. Apart from the apparent injustice of making 
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indemnity dependent on such fine and contestable reasoning, such a test is 
calculated to produce disputed claims and litigation.
219
 
 
This passage was quoted and given support in the Derksen
220
, additionally 
the analysis was in Derksen
221
 held to be applicable to all insurance policies 
equally. The Supreme Court continued in Derksen
222
 by stating that it was 
not desirable to attempt to decide which of two concurrent causes was the 
proximate cause.
223
 
 
McLachlin J claims in her judgement in C.C.R. Fishing
224
 that the 
proximate cause rule creates claim disputes and litigations. However there 
are no investigations attached to the statement and as such the statement is 
questionable. Against the Norwegian background, where the number of 
litigations rose when changing from the proximate cause rule to the 
apportionment rule, the statement seems uncertain. It could be claimed that 
in the Norwegian case it was rather the difficulties in applying the 
apportionment rule than the benefits of the proximate cause rule that lead to 
the increasing litigations.
225
 Saunders also has a point in saying that the 
problem when applying a rule of causation rather lies in the problems with 
causation than the rule itself
226
. 
 
Another criticism against the proximate cause rule by McLachlin J is that it 
deals with fine distinctions that make it unfair to decide on such grounds. 
Saunders response to this by saying that courts always makes decisions 
based on fine distinctions; this is a part of the legal function.
227
 There might 
be some truth to Saunders observation but even if law are based on 
distinctions these distinctions should not be “fine distinctions” to the extent 
that they seem random and unfair. A related criticism by McLachlin J. is 
that the debate concerning the proximate cause turns into a metaphysical 
debate.  
 
The fore and most benefit with the Canadian approach as it seem to develop 
is that this approach moves its focus to what is included in the policy rather 
than what is excluded. The Wayne Tank principle gives the effect for the 
underwriters that it is not only important to focus on what is insured under 
the policy but also what is excluded. This would most likely also fit the 
intentions of the parties better.  
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5.1.1.3 Further developments  
The Derksen
228
 has not lead to an apportionment but some articles suggest 
that apportionment should be possible. Once the court has concluded that 
the loss resulting from an excluding peril should not be compensated under 
the policy the step to an apportionment of the loss as a whole is not big. 
When the loss is divided and not fall in its entirety under one policy it opens 
a way for apportionment. David and Caplan argue in favour of 
apportionment by pointing out that cover only should be available for loss 
attributed to the insured peril.
229
 Also Saunders seems to suggest that 
apportionment could be an alternative to the traditional view of “all or 
nothing”.230  
 
David and Caplan point out that it in many cases of independent concurrent 
causes would be hard to allocate a specific part of the loss to an excluded 
risk but that one way to solve the problem would be to apportion the loss on 
a percentage basis.
231
  
5.1.2 Australia and the proximate cause rule 
Australia seems in general continuing to support the doctrine of proximate 
cause similar as used in England. As in England there is a possibility for the 
parties to use another causal expression by stipulate so in the contract.
232
 
Even if the proximate cause principle is still used it seems, at least to some 
extent, exist some criticism to the proximate cause principle.   
 
Recently, with the floods occurred in Australia 2010-2011, the proximate 
cause principle was in question in regard of the Wayne Tank principle. 
Many assureds were left without cover as a result of the Wayne Tank 
principle when the floods was only one of several proximate causes for the 
loss.
233
 Some legislative changes were passed in 2012 to answer to the 
criticism, the changes concerned consumers and small business owners.
234
 It 
is worth noting that these changes was made fore and foremost for the 
benefit of consumers and only small business owners and would therefore in 
most cases not directly concern marine insurance. However, it is interesting 
as a part of the criticism against the Wayne Tank principle. 
 
Some more general criticism in regard of the proximate cause has also been 
brought forward. Professor Martin David gave some critic to the proximate 
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cause principle on a seminar for the Australian Insurance Law Association 
in 1998. As in England the proximate cause in Australia should be 
determined by the common sense rule. Davies argues that the common 
sense rule is a too simple way of determine the complex question of 
proximate cause. In using the common sense rule it is rather the “feeling” of 
the court that determine whether the policy will cover the peril or not. He 
continues by saying that the parties to the contract at least should be able to 
demand a more intellectual approach to the problem.
235
 
 
Davies is also criticising the principle that if there are two proximate causes 
and one is excluded the loss will not be recoverable under the policy i.e. the 
Wayne Tank principle. In Petersen v Union des Assurances de Paris 
IARD
236
 Rolfe J argued that it there is no rational reason to exclude cover in 
the case of one excluded peril and one covered peril while the policy will 
cover if the peril is covered in one instance and the other peril is neither 
included nor excluded. Rolfe J stated: 
 
One reason suggested is that in the first case the agreement of the parties 
allows recovery because the insured peril is, at least, a proximate cause of 
loss, and there is no exclusion of the other cause, whereas in the second case 
there is a positive exclusion of another proximate cause by the agreement of 
the parties. So, it is put, the insurer has positively declined, by the exception, 
to accord indemnity in such a situation.
237
 
 
The Court of Appeal had no reason to apply the Wayne Tank principle 
wherefore they did not consider the thought brought forward by Rolfe J to 
any great extent, however they did say that there was some force to the 
thinking.
238
 The Wayne Tank principle has however been applied in later 
cases for example in the non-marine case Central Australian Aboriginal 
Congress Inc v CGU Insurance Limited.
239
  
5.2 Industry aspects 
Whether the loss falls within the policy or not is of importance for the 
marine insurance market. When premiums are calculated several different 
factors are taken into account e.g. the choice of law under the charterparty 
and trading patterns. In addition, when earlier years of claim statistics is 
available these are considered when the premiums are calculated. The causal 
expression is a part of this calculation which makes it hard to predict its 
specific influence.  
 
In order to calculate an accurate premium certainty is important. In general 
few claims are litigated in the area of marine insurance making it hard to 
find specific patterns. Whether the proximate cause principle or the 
apportionment principle gives the highest degree of certainty is hard to settle 
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but some general points can be made.
240
 More cases are available under 
English law of the simple fact that the English insurance market is bigger 
than the Nordic market. It could be that this would create a pattern with the 
consequence of certainty.
241
  
 
When the apportionment rule was first inserted into the Norwegian Plan the 
number of litigations was raised which could indicate the uncertainty of the 
apportionment rule. However, the proximate cause rule has also been 
criticised as random, especially in regard of the Wayne Tank principle.
242
 
 
The benefit of the apportionment rule is that it create more certainty as to 
what perils are covered which makes it easier to calculate the premiums. 
Under the proximate cause principle it also has to be included what perils 
are excluded to accurately set the premium. Since many losses results from 
several causes is it important to know what perils are excluded since the 
underwriter would not be held liable when one of the proximate causes for a 
loss is excluded. Theoretically, if a peril commonly occurring is excluded 
under the policy this would decrease the risk of liability for the underwriter.  
 
In both the English and the Nordic systems there are possibilities to change 
the causal expression e.g. to not use the apportionment principle or the 
proximate cause principle.
243
 
 
It seems that many of the widely used standard contracts e.g. the Institute 
Clauses continue to use the proximate cause principle indicating that the 
industry is not dissatisfied with the current legal position. The Institute 
Clauses are commonly using “caused by” as a causative expression however 
this has been interpreted as “proximately caused by”.244 The same can be 
said about the Nordic Plan, if the parties where dissatisfied with the causal 
expression provided by the Norwegian Plan, on which the Nordic Plan is 
based, they could have changed it in the Nordic version.  
 
It might be that the consequences are of greater importance for the assured. 
If the assured believes that he is covered for a specific loss he would not 
take out yet another insurance. However, in a situation of two concurrent 
losses of which one is excluded he will not be compensated under the 
proximate cause, on the other hand he might recover for the entire loss in a 
situation where a part of the loss depends on a not covered peril. Under the 
apportionment rule he has the possibility to get compensation for the part of 
the loss attributable to the loss he has insured.  
 
Davies has claimed that the principles of causation “are too firmly 
established to be changed without a paradigm shift that would cause 
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massive reverberations throughout the insurance industry”.245 It is hard to 
believe that so would be the case since many of the underwriters today are 
already insuring under various standard contracts, both using the proximate 
cause principle and the apportionment principle. Examples can be made of 
the Swedish Club
246
, Skuld
247
, Gard
248
 and Codan Marine
249
 which all 
insure under both Nordic and English conditions.  
 
What could happen if the causal expression was changes is that the industry 
adopt to the change and as a part of their calculations when setting the 
premiums include the “new” causal expression. Otherwise the industry 
could use their freedom of contract as to change the causal expression 
similar to what happened in Norway where the apportionment principle was 
inserted instead of the dominant cause principle. 
5.3 Would the proximate cause principle 
benefit from some changes? 
One of the repeated criticism against the proximate cause principle which 
has been brought forward in both Canada and Australia is its treatment of 
the situation when one loss is covered while one is expressly excluded i.e. 
the Wayne Tank principle.
250
 One of the problems with this principle is that 
in the situation of concurrent proximate causes it focuses on what is 
excluded and not what is actually covered. Theoretically, an underwriter 
would escape liability to compensate by adding exclusion clauses.  
 
It is wishful that the causal expression is reflecting the actual cover intended 
by the parties. If the assured pays for a specific peril to be covered this peril 
should for obvious reasons also be covered by the policy. If one of the perils 
causing the loss were an excluded loss the policy would offer no protection 
even if one peril is covered.  
 
On the other hand it is not wishful to not give an exclusion clause any effect 
at all. If it was enough for one peril to be covered under the policy in the 
situation of concurrent proximate causes it would not matter if the other 
perils were excluded or not. As Lord Diplock explained the reason for the 
principle: 
 
The reason is that if the underwriters were held liable for loss, they would not 
be free of it. Seeing that they have stipulated for freedom, the only way of 
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giving effect to it is by exempting them altogether. The loss is not 
apportionable. Hence no part of it can fall on the policy.
251
 
 
Assuming there is no possibility to divide the loss it is hard to see how both 
the cover and the exception clause would be given effect if not for the 
solution in the Wayne Tank.
252
 
 
However, here the decision in the Derksen
253
 might give a good middle 
ground since it would give effect to both the covered provisions and the 
exceptions i.e. it is only possible to recover the part of the loss actually 
covered. The Derksen
254
 require it to be possible to divide the loss, which 
seems to be unknown in England.  
 
Apportionment would solve some of the criticism brought forward by 
McLachlin J. When there are several concurrent causes to a loss it is 
reasonable and fair that an underwriter compensate only for the risk he 
accepted, similar it is reasonable that the assured get compensated for risks 
he insured.  
 
An apportionment rule would also make the “fine distinctions” less fine 
since it would be possible for a way between “everything or nothing”. 
However, it might prove hard to predict the outcome of such a principle 
since the apportionment principle is highly dependent upon specific 
circumstances of each case.
255
 
 
Many problems with causation probably lies in the problem of causation 
rather than which specific principle that is used.
256
 However it would be 
wishful to find a principle that gives effect to both cover and exclusion 
clauses. It might not be necessary to use an apportionment principle but to 
exclude the entire loss because of an exclusion clause as in the Wayne Tank 
principle seems unreasonable wherefore a solution as in Derksen
257
 would 
be beneficial.  
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6 Conclusion 
Causation in marine insurance is a matter of importance and it is vital to 
appreciate the difficulties built into causation. When deciding if the 
necessary causal connection exists many different factors need to be taken 
into account e.g. the expression used in the insurance policy, intention of the 
parties but also the specific circumstances of each case. In England the 
entire loss is attributed to the proximate cause while under the Nordic Plan 
the loss can be apportioned between several causes. However, both systems 
provide some exceptions for specific perils or combination of perils.  
 
Firstly, the legal position in the case of a combination of two marine perils 
will be discussed. In the first fictional situation described in the introduction 
a ship runs aground and later sinks due to bad weather. Under the English 
proximate cause rule the entire loss would be attributed to the dominant 
cause meaning that the underwriter would be liable to compensate for 
everything or nothing. Under the Nordic apportionment rule the loss would 
be apportion depending on each cause‟s attribution to the loss.  
 
The benefit of the Nordic apportionment rule is that it makes it possible to 
attribute the loss and therein the possibility to take the specific 
circumstances of every case into account. This also makes the Nordic 
approach flexible and it gives effect to both covered perils and excluded 
perils. If a specific peril was to be excluded the proportion of that loss is not 
recoverable under the policy, however that part of the loss could be 
attributed to another policy covering the peril.  
 
In contrast the English proximate cause rule does not allow apportionment 
of the loss but it might be easier to predict the outcome compared to the 
Nordic System. For the parties in a business situation predictability is 
important since they know what to adopt to e.g. the underwriter knows the 
risk wherefore he can calculate the premiums accurately. The proximate 
cause rule, however, is not always fair and can seem inflexible in its 
application. 
 
In the Wayne Tank
258
 decision Their Lordships held that, in the case of 
concurrent proximate causes of which one cause is included in the policy 
while the other cause is expressly excluded, the policy would not respond. 
Hence the English proximate cause gives effect to the exclusion clause but 
are not considering that one proximate cause is actually covered by the 
policy. This can seem unfair and it also make it hard to know in what 
situation the underwriter is covered since if an insured peril is combined 
with an exclusion the cover would disappear altogether.  
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It might be that the Canadian approach after Derksen
259
 is a better solution. 
In this case the Supreme Court of Canada held that the underwriter was not 
liable to compensate for the loss sole attributable to the excluded peril. In its 
decision the Supreme Court of Canada gave effect to both the covered peril 
and the excluded peril.  
 
It is worth noting that even if there been criticism against the proximate 
cause in Australia the proximate cause has not changed. It might be that it 
would disadvantageously to change a well-established principle since the 
precedence that has been built up gives some certainty.   
 
What are presented above is the main principles of the two systems but 
these principles are subject of some exceptions. One of the more important 
exceptions is that war perils are treated differently than marine perils under 
both systems. In the English Marine Insurance Act war perils are included in 
“maritime perils” but they are often excepted in specific standard contracts. 
In the Nordic Plan there are some special rules regarding the combination of 
war and marine perils. 
 
The second example described in the beginning concerns the combination of 
a war and marine peril. In English marine insurance there are often so-called 
paramount clauses inserted into the contract meaning that in the situation of 
two proximate causes of which one was excepted under the paramount 
clause the assured would not be able to recover. The different from an 
“ordinary” exclusion is that a paramount clause is against every other clause 
in the contract while an “ordinary” exclusion can be valid in relation to one 
specific peril only.  
 
Consequently, the marine underwriter would be held liable to compensate 
for the entire loss, even if a part of the loss was because of a war peril, if the 
marine peril was held to be the proximate cause. However, in the case of 
concurrent proximate causes the marine underwriter would not be held 
liable if a paramount clause including war perils was included in the policy. 
 
In the Nordic Plan the regulation about war perils are more complicated. 
Another causal expression is used in the situation of one war and one marine 
peril, the modified dominant cause principle. This principle says that if the 
dominant cause was the war peril the entire loss would be allocated here, 
and if the marine peril was dominant the entire loss would be allocated to 
the marine peril. If there is doubt as to what peril is the dominant peril the 
loss shall be divided equally between the perils causing the loss. In some 
situations of war perils the loss shall be deemed to be caused entirely by war 
perils e.g. when the ship is damaged through the use of arms. When there 
are uncertainty if the marine or war peril caused the loss the loss shall be 
divided equally.  
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Therefore, four different answers are possible for the second example in the 
introduction. Firstly, if one of the causes is dominant wherefore the entire 
loss will be allocated to this cause. Secondly, if none of the causes is held as 
dominant the loss will be divided equally. Thirdly, in some situations the 
loss shall be deemed to be caused by the war peril wherefore the underwriter 
insuring such a loss will be liable to compensate for the entire loss. 
Fourthly, the loss will be equally divided if there is uncertainty as to which 
peril caused the loss.  
 
The paramount clauses in the English system commonly cover also other 
specified perils, e.g. radioactive contamination or strike. Radioactive 
contamination is, among others, excepted in the Nordic Plan by the so-
called RACE II perils. The paramount clause regarding radioactive 
contamination and the RACE II perils are identical and prescribes if 
radioactive contamination has indirectly, directly or contributed to the loss 
for the entire loss to be allocated to this peril. This is due to the reinsurance 
market which do not want to insure terrorist attacks after 9
th
 of September 
2011.  
 
If, in the first example from the introduction, the loss would be caused by 
radioactive contamination the entire loss would be allocated to the 
radioactive contamination even if the radioactive contamination only had 
contributed to the loss. This is held equally for the two systems. 
 
If loss would have been intentionally caused by the assured in one of the 
examples mentioned in the introduction the underwriter would not be held 
liable to compensate. In the event of negligence the situation is a bit 
different under the two systems. In the Nordic Plan the assured would be 
compensated in the event of ordinary negligence but in the situation of gross 
negligence the compensation could be deducted. Under the English Marine 
Insurance Act the underwriter has to stand the risk of negligence, however 
in ITCH and IHC it is stated that the underwriter is not liable to compensate 
in the situation of negligence in regard of certain situation e.g. loading or 
discharging. 
 
For the industry it is important whether the loss falls under the insurance 
policy or not. It is also important for the assured to retrieve an insurance 
covering the intended perils, equally it is important for the underwriter to be 
able to calculate the premium accurately. For these reasons foreseeability is 
crucial. The benefit with the apportionment rule is that it is easier to know 
what perils are covered by the policy even if the actual proportion that will 
be attributed to different perils are uncertain. However when the 
apportionment rule was inserted into the Nordic Plan it raised the number of 
litigations due to this uncertainty.  
 
The benefit with the proximate cause rule lies in the fact that it is easier to 
find atypical situations for when different perils will be considered as 
proximate. However, due to the Wayne Tank principle the entire loss will be 
rendered unrecoverable if one of the perils are excluded under the policy. 
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This would make it harder to know what is covered by the insurance since 
one also have to take the exclusion clauses into account. Theoretically, it 
would be possible to decrease the risk of the underwriter to compensate by 
adding an exclusion clause which commonly occur.  
 
The effect of changing the proximate cause principle against the 
apportionment rule or vice versa is hard to tell. There are some criticism 
against the proximate cause rule but also against the apportionment rule. It 
is not unlikely however that these problems rather relates to the problem of 
causation as a whole.  
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